In 'Against agent-based virtue ethics ' (2004) Michael Brady rejects agent-based virtue ethics on the grounds that it fails to capture the commonsense distinction between an agent's doing the right thing, and her doing it for the right reason. In his view, the failure to account for this distinction has paradoxical results, making it unable to explain why an agent has a duty to perform a given action. I argue that Brady's objection relies on the assumption that an agent-based account is committed to defining obligations in terms of actual motives. If we reject this view, and instead provide a version of agent-basing that determines obligations in terms of the motives of the hypothetical virtuous agent, the paradox disappears.
Although Brady distinguishes between Slote's account and Aristotelian accounts in much the same way that Slote does, he refers to both accounts as 'agent-based.' For the sake of clarity, I will in what follows use the term 'agent-based virtue ethics' to refer to accounts that ties rightness to the actual motives of the agent, while taking virtue as fundamental. I will use the term 'Aristotelian virtue ethics' to refer to accounts that tie rightness to the hypothetical motives of virtuous people, while defining virtue in terms of eudaimonia. account of action guidance, while retaining an account of action assessment that ties rightness to the agent's motive for acting. This will enable us to say that an agent made the right decision in choosing to perform a certain action, but because he was not well-motivated the act in question is morally wrong. The main problem with Slote's account, in my view, is that he does not explicitly develop or defend this method of determining obligations, despite the fact that it is required to make sense of his discussion of the distinction between doing the right thing and doing the right thing for the right reason.
I
Slote is aware that agent-based virtue ethics does not capture the distinction between acting rightly and acting rightly for the right reasons, but does not think that intuition should be taken as the final arbiter in these matters. In an effort to explain away the significance of this distinction, he considers Sidgwick's example of the malicious prosecutor, 'who does his duty by trying to convict a defendant, but who is motivated by malice rather than by a sense of public duty.'
11 Some critics object that agentbasing is committed to judging as wrong the intuitively right act in this case. 12 By saying that the prosecutor acts wrongly by prosecuting from malice, we seem to imply that the agent should not have prosecuted, or that he did not have a duty or obligation to do so, regardless of his motives. And this is clearly an implausible result.
Foreseeing this objection, Slote agrees that in this instance agent-basing will insist that the prosecutor acts wrongly. However, he argues that agent-basing can nevertheless allow that the prosecutor has a duty to prosecute, and that this allows it to make the distinction between 'doing one's duty for the right reasons and thus acting rightly, on the one hand, and doing one's duty for the wrong reasons and thus acting wrongly.'
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The important question is how such a duty or obligation can be understood in agentbased terms. In considering this question Slote notes that a failure to prosecute will also express a bad motive. He asks us to imagine that the prosecutor, 'horrified by his This leads Brady to conclude that, if Slote insists that the rightness or wrongness of an action depends upon the goodness of the motives expressed by that action, he will be unable to explain why the malicious prosecutor has a duty to prosecute, and thus be unable to explain how one can do one's duty but for the wrong reason.
II
Brady has identified a serious problem for Slote's agent-based ethics, namely that it is unclear from his discussion of the prosecutor case why the agent has a duty to prosecute, given his malicious motives. Slote assesses actions on the basis of the motives from which they proceed, but on what grounds could such an account determine obligations? In cases where the agent is well-motivated, it seems clear that she should perform that action that would allow her to express her good motives. But in cases where the agent is not well-motivated, a problem appears. In the prosecutor case, we have seen, Brady takes Slote as defining obligations in terms of the motives which would be expressed if the agent acted otherwise. The first problem Brady identifies in this regard is that this account of obligations conflicts with Slote's insistence that agent-based virtue ethics bases rightness on the motive from which the act proceeds. A second problem he identifies is that the use of such an account of obligations leads to paradoxical results. I will consider these two problems separately, beginning with the latter.
Brady is correct in claiming that the use of an account of obligation in terms of the motive that would be expressed if the agent acted otherwise leads to paradoxical results. In his discussion of the prosecutor case Slote seems both to be saying that (i) it would be wrong to prosecute from malice and that (ii) it would be wrong not to prosecute. If it is reasonable to infer from (ii) that the agent has an obligation to prosecute, then Slote has failed to explain why the prosecutor, given his malicious motives, nevertheless has a duty to prosecute. chapter by considering an account of action guidance that is directly derived from his criterion of right action, and that can be formulated as follows:
AG am : One ought to perform the action that will exhibit or express a virtuous motive, or at least will not exhibit or express a vicious motive.
Slote distinguishes two senses in which a moral theory can be said to be practical. The first of these is that it can be used as a decision-making tool by an agent facing a moral dilemma, and the second is that it can be used by a philosopher or an adherent of that theory to determine the agent's obligation in any given case. Slote denies that agent-basing is practical in the first sense, on the grounds that 'the morally good person isn't guided by a theory or (agent-based) moral principle or even a sense of rightness as much as by a good heart that seeks to do good for and by people.' 19 He still thinks, however, that a principle such as AG am can be used in the second sense mentioned above. One of the problems with an action-guiding principle such as AG am , even if used in this limited sense, is the one discussed before, namely that it cannot explain why a badly-motivated agent nevertheless has an obligation to perform a certain action, and I agree with Brady that this is a serious problem for Slote.
I'm not convinced, however, that this is a fatal problem for agent-based virtue ethics.
There seems to me no reason, in principle, why a moral theory must employ an 18 Slote (2001) One of the advantages of a decision-making principle that defines obligations in terms of the motives of the hypothetical virtuous agent, is that obligations do not somehow change depending on the agent's motive, in the way that Brady argues the criterion employed by Slote does. It allows us to explain how it is possible for an agent to perform their duty but nevertheless act wrongly. In the case of the malicious prosecutor we could say, following AG h , that the agent has a duty to prosecute, because this is what someone motivated by a concern for doing their job will do in these circumstances. However, if the agent then goes on to prosecute from malice, he will be performing his duty for the wrong reason, and therefore act wrongly. The advantage of this approach is that it allows us to assess the act as morally wrong without thereby implying that the agent should not have prosecuted. In this way it avoids Brady's paradox.
By way of illustration, consider the case of a man who impregnates a woman who is deeply in love with him. In such a case we might say that the right thing to do would be to marry her (or at least to support her in some other way), perhaps giving as a reason for our judgement that it is the decent thing to do, or that it will allow him to express virtuous motives. If, however, the man then goes on to marry the woman with the exclusive motive of securing a large inheritance, it would be inappropriate to say that he did the right thing despite acting from greed. x and y? Presumably, following AA, she should choose the act that will allow her to express virtuous motives (say, benevolence), but how does she know which action will allow her to do so? In most cases this will be obvious, so that the question of which action-guiding principle to follow does not even arise. However, in many cases it will not be obvious what to do, either because it is a complex case or because the agent is not (yet) fully benevolent (she may lack the necessary skills and knowledge).
In such cases, examining her own motives and trying to act on whichever of these she perceives to be virtuous will not produce an act that is fully benevolent (that is, motivated by true benevolence). Arguably the most reliable way to express benevolence is to consider the ways in which truly benevolent people characteristically act: 'How do they manage to succeed in helping others?', 'How do they express their benevolence?', and 'What do they typically do in this kind of situation?'.
In most cases, this will allow the agent to express a virtuous motive and hence to act rightly. It does not follow, however, that adhering to the maxim, 'Do what a virtuous person would characteristically do in the circumstances' will necessarily issue in an act that is right, for the agent's true reason for acting might be to deceive others in thinking that she is virtuous. In such cases our revised agent-based account will assess the act as wrong, even though it will hold that the agent made the right decision (i.e., chose an act that would have allowed the agent to express a virtuous motive).
22
We are now in a position to see how close this account comes to making the traditional distinction between doing the right thing and doing the right thing for the right reason. Consider again the case of the man who marries a pregnant woman, but who is motivated exclusively by a desire to secure an inheritance. In this case our revised agent-based account says that the agent ought to marry the woman (or that marrying her would be the right decision), but that if he does so for the wrong reason his act would be morally wrong. By contrast, traditional deontological and consequentialist approaches say that marrying her is the right act, but that if the agent does so from greed he would perform a right act for the wrong reason. Hence they make a distinction between right acts and praiseworthy (or well-motivated) acts, and although they agree with agent-based accounts that the praiseworthiness of an act depends on the agent's motives, their focus is on the first, that is, on providing an account of rightness in terms of consequences or principles. By contrast, the agentbased account proposed here distinguishes between making a right decision (on the grounds that it conforms to what virtuous agents characteristically do in similar circumstances) and performing a right (or praiseworthy) action, and its focus is on the latter.
IV
By way of conclusion I will briefly consider two possible objections one might have to the revised agent-based account. The first is that by incorporating a hypothetical principle of action guidance (AG h ), while retaining a criterion of right action based on actual motives (AA), we end up with a 'hybrid' account of morality, and that this in effect means that we've failed to defend an agent-based morality. This objection is closely related to one mentioned earlier, namely that the revised account may seem somewhat ad hoc. In response, and in addition to what I said before in this regard, I
22 It is worth noting that this account of rightness is not perfectionist in the way that Aristotelian versions are, insofar as it requires only that the action does not express or exhibit a vicious motive. This means that an agent who has certain shortcomings with regards to virtue, but who tries to do what virtuous agents characteristically do, will act rightly even if they fail to act from full virtue. As long as the action does not display vice (such as carelessness, insensitivity, or wilful ignorance), it will be morally right or acceptable.
would simply deny that the account is in any way a 'hybrid.' Instead, it is firmly agent-based in that the focus remains on providing an account of right action in terms of the actual motives from which the act proceeds. AG h does not say anything about what makes an action right. It only provides a practical decision-making tool, advising that the best or most reliable way to go about being and becoming good people and acting well is for us to try to do what virtuous people characteristically do (which includes acting for the same reasons and in the same way that they characteristically do). As we have seen, emulating virtuous people does not necessarily result in a right act, for to act well we need to be motivated by virtue. To understand -on a more theoretical level -why the actions that virtuous people characteristically perform are right (and why superficial emulation will not do), we need to make reference to the motives from which they typically proceed, and this brings us back to an agent-based with duty) purely by accident or for reasons that are morally objectionable. In such cases Kantians would say that the agent failed to act for the sake of duty. However, as noted before, their emphasis is on acting rightly (or doing one's duty), rather than acting for the right reasons.
By providing a non-consequentialist account of right action, agent-based virtue ethics avoids the problem of consequential luck. An agent will be held responsible for the consequences of her action if they are the result of non-virtuous traits such as carelessness, wilful ignorance, or the like, but not if they are purely the result of bad luck. Slote hints at this advantage when he writes:
…motive is fundamentally at least relevant to the moral character of any action. For if we judge the actions of ourselves or others simply by their effects in the world, we end up unable to distinguish accidentally or ironically useful actions (or slips on banana peels) from actions that we actually morally admire and that are morally good and praiseworthy.
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In an agent-based morality, we have seen, an agent could make the right decision and do his or her duty for the wrong reasons (or for no reasons at all), and in this way there is an element of luck involved. However, it would deny that such an act can be described as morally right, for in an agent-based view an act is right only if it is praiseworthy, that is, motivated by virtue. Of course, it could be argued that agentbasing is vulnerable to a different kind of moral luck, what is often referred to as 'constitutive luck,' for character itself is at least partly the result of factors beyond the individual's control. I cannot address this problem here, except to note that once we give up the idea that agents are responsible, if not for their character and motives as such, then at least for the motives they choose to express in their actions, we will have to abandon the whole project of morality and the notion of moral agency, admitting, 
